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I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout history, virtually all societies have relied to some ex-
tent on the generosity of religious and faith-based organizations.1
From operating soup kitchens and shelters to caring for children and
the mentally ill, these religious organizations have often filled vital
areas of societal need when the government fails to do so.2  The
United States is no exception to this rule. Throughout the last half
century, the federal government has increasingly looked to religious
and faith-based organizations for assistance in meeting its societal ob-
ligations. 3 This reliance has grown to unprecedented levels during
the last decade, particularly due to public support for partnering
programs like Charitable Choice and the White House Office of
Faith-Based and Community Initiatives.4
The fall of 2005 saw this partnership put to a monumental test,
however, when Hurricanes Katrina and Rita thrashed their way
through the Gulf Coast region. In the wake of the most devastating
. J.D. Candidate, 2007, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.B.A., 2004, University of
Michigan Ross School of Business. The author would like to thank Sarah Gordon, Theodore
Ruger, andJessica Keefe for their help in writing and editing this Comment.
' See, e.g., STEPHEN V. MONSMA, WHEN SACRED AND SECULAR MIX: RELIGIOUS NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS AND PUBLIC MONEY 8 (1996) (discussing the historical role of religiously moti-
vated groups in public service).
See id.; see also Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Faith-Based Initiative and the Constitution,
55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 5 (2005) (discussing the "deep roots" of partnerships between govern-
ment and religiously affiliated entities in circumstances such as state-financed health insurance
and a variety of other social services).
5 See David K. Ryden & Jeffrey Polet, Introduction: Faith-Based Initiatives in the Limelight, in
SANCTIONING RELIGION? POLITICS, LAW, AND FAITH-BASED PUBLIC SERVICES 1, 1-2 (David K.
Ryden & Jeffrey Polet eds., 2005) (citing a "long and substantial history of government collabo-
ration with religious nonprofits in social service provision").
A 2001 Pew Research Center Poll shows that seventy-five percent of the Americans polled
support government funding of faith-based organizations. See THE PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR
THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS, FAITH-BASED FUNDING BACKED, BUT CHURCH-STATE DOUBTS
ABOUND (2001), http://people-press.org/reports/print.php3?ReportID=15. Furthermore, sev-
enty-five percent say that churches, synagogues, and other houses of worship assist in solving
societal problems. Id. at § 1.
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hurricanes in American history,5 the Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency (FEMA) was forced to rely on religious and faith-based
organizations to house and feed more than 500,000 people displaced
by the storms.6 In return for this assistance, the agency announced
that it would use public funds to reimburse these groups for expenses
associated with providing shelter, food, and supplies.' The federal
government also acknowledged that this decision was an unprece-
dented step and marked the first time the government had directly
compensated religious groups for their help in disaster relief s Never-
theless, FEMA's plan was met with considerable approval by many
citizens as being an appropriate response to the massive devastation.
9
There were also many opponents to the plan, however, who
claimed it was merely an effort by the President and FEMA to restore
their blemished reputations by "playing to religious conservatives."' 0
These critics also argued that regardless of the underlying reasoning
for the plan, the funding violated the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment" because the federal money allegedly supported
preaching, proselytizing, and prayer.'2
Although many of these claims were false exaggerations, to this
date there has been no official determination whether the funding
program did in fact cross the line of constitutional permissibility.
5 See Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2005 Hurricane Season,
http://www.fema.gov/hazard/hurricane/hu-recovery.shtm (last visited Oct. 15, 2006).
6 See Alan Cooperman & Elizabeth Williamson, F1EMA Plans to Reimburse Faith Groups for Aid,
WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2005, at Al.
7 Id.
See id. Instead of making direct payments to the religious groups themselves, the govern-
ment usually contracted with religiously affiliated organizations that have religious identities
and provide secularized professional service but do not engage in practices of worship. See
Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 2, at 5-6 (discussing how the government has extended Medicaid
and Medicare to religiously affiliated hospitals and how it has contracted for social services from
Catholic charities andJewish Family Services).
9 For example, Joe Becker, Senior Vice President for Preparedness and Response with the
Red Cross, remarked, "I believe it's appropriate for the federal government to assist the faith
community because of the scale and scope of the effort and how long it's lasting." Cooperman
& Williamson, supra note 6.
10 Id.
" The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides in part that "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
" See Press Release, Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Americans
United Criticizes Lack of Accountability in FEMA Funding of Religious Groups (Sept. 27, 2005),
available at http://www.au.org/site/News2?abbr-pr&page=NewsArticle&id=7579&security=
1002&news iv ctrl=1842 [hereinafter Americans United] (criticizing FEMA's plan for its failure
to separate "evangelism from relief work"); Press Release, Freedom from Religion Foundation,
FEMA Church Give-Away Sets Egregious Precedent-As Usual, Churches Get Credit, Taxpayers
Get the Bill (Sept. 28, 2005), available at http://www.ffrf.org/news/2005/
faithbasedFEMAII.php [hereinafter Freedom from Religion Foundation] (criticizing reim-
bursement, in part, because it applies retroactively without a contractual agreement).
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Moreover, because U.S. citizens have the legal right to challenge this
type of congressional spending,13 the current environment remains
ripe for a lawsuit.
Fortunately for the federal government, however, this Comment
will show why the hurricane funding should ultimately survive a con-
stitutional challenge. Moreover, even if the funding does violate the
Constitution, this Comment will also show why the political environ-
ment makes it unlikely that the program will be challenged. In arriv-
ing at these conclusions, this Comment examines both the historical
development of the Establishment Clause as well as the questionable
actions taken by the government in response to the hurricanes. Spe-
cifically, Part II explains the combined role of the federal govern-
ment and religious organizations in providing disaster relief. Part III
then considers the development of the Establishment Clause
throughout its history. Part IV suggests the potential legal challenges
following FEMA's relief efforts. Finally, Part V explains why it is
unlikely that a lawsuit will ever be pursued.
II. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S PARTNERSHIP WITH RELIGIOUS
ORGANIZATIONS IN DISASTER RELIEF EFFORTS
Coordinated disaster relief has a long history in the United States
stretching almost as far back as the country's founding.1 4 In the early
1800s, though, relief provided by the federal government was limited
to various ad hoc legislative acts passed in response to natural disas-
ters.1 5 It was only during the twentieth century that the government
adopted a proactive approach to providing relief and created agen-
cies like the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration within the
Department of Housing and Urban Development. 6 In the mean-
time, religious and faith-based organizations often led the way in
meeting societal needs. 7 The country's dependence on these reli-
gious groups led to an environment in which the dividing line be-
tween public and private disaster relief was often quite blurred.
1 8
" "[Flederal taxpayers have standing to raise Establishment Clause claims against exercises
of congressional power under the taxing and spending power of Article I, § 8, of the Constitu-
tion." Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 618 (1988) (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968)).
'" See Federal Emergency Management Administration, FEMA History, available at
http://fema.gov/about/history.shtm (last visited Oct. 15, 2006) (tracing FEMA's origins to the
Congressional Act of 1803, an early example of disaster legislation).
" See id.
'6 See id.
See MONSMA, supra note 1, at 8.
8 See id. at 5 ("Without government funds, many private, nonprofit associations would col-
lapse or have to cut back their programs drastically; without private, nonprofit associations,
government would have to expand dramatically to meet public needs in such areas as health,
Feb. 2007]
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This division began to sharpen in 1979-around the same time
that President Jimmy Carter established FEMA.' 9 In creating the
agency, Carter's goal was to centralize the various federal emergency
functions and to streamline the government's response in providing
aid. 0 To Carter's credit, the advent of FEMA was quite successful in
meeting these goals.2' Nevertheless, the agency's creation failed to
provide any clarity about the remaining role of religious organiza-
tions in providing disaster relief. Rather, the federal courts ultimately
created some clarity through a "separationist" movement.
2 2
During this movement, many scholars advocated for a stricter
separation between government and religion. As a result, many
groups that had traditionally sought government support in provid-
ing disaster relief attempted to avoid legal challenge by creating af-
filiates in which they substantially downplayed their religious iden-
tity. 23 These groups also responded to the movement by calling the
separationist movement's beliefs discriminatory and urged the view
that accepting federal funds would "compromise the very essence of
their religious mission and identity. 2 4 As an unfortunate result, many
religious groups abandoned the practice of providing disaster relief
altogether.
Congress attempted to reverse this trend, however, when it en-
acted the Charitable Choice provision in 1996 as part of a broad legis-
lative effort for welfare reform. 26 The official purpose of Charitable
Choice was to "level the playing field[]" for groups receiving govern-
ment funds, v and to enable religious organizations to "accept gov-
ernment funds without the pressure to sideline their religious charac-
education, social services, and overseas relief. In the end... 'Mutual dependence blurs the
lines between public and private.'").
'9 FEMA History, supra note 14.
22 Id.
21 See, e.g., id. (describing how FEMA proved its efficiency during events like the Cuban refu-
gee crisis, the nuclear accident at Three Mile Island, and Hurricane Andrew).
'" Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 2, at 46.
For example, groups such as Catholic Charities and Lutheran Social Services were only
religiously affiliated groups that had ties to the church but delivered services through separate
corporate entities. These separate corporate entities had nonreligious governing boards, had
segregated financial accounts, and operated in such a manner that the religiousness of the or-
ganization had been removed. See Ryden & Polet, supra note 3, at 1-2.
24 Id.
21 See id.
216 See Michele Estrin Gilman, "Charitable Choice"and the Accountability Challenge: Reconciling the
Needfor Regulation with the First Amendment Religion Clauses, 55 VAND. L. REV. 799, 806 (2002) (de-
scribing the origins, legislative history, and effects of Charitable Choice as part of the massive
reform of the federal welfare system).
2 Ryden & Polet, supra note 3, at 2.
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ter." s In reality, though, Charitable Choice served as a means for
politicians, who believed a faith element was a large part of religious
organizations' historical success, to bring religion back into relief ef-
forts.m
To accomplish these goals, Charitable Choice implemented three
major changes. First, the program required federal officials to give
sectarian organizations the same consideration as secular nonprofits
when awarding social service grants.0 Second, it imposed a series of
protective measures so the receipt of federal money by faith-based
organizations would not force these groups to compromise their reli-
gious affiliation or mission. Finally, Charitable Choice protected po-
tential recipients by requiring all aid providers to respect the reli-
gious liberty of their clients and by banning groups from diverting
federal funds to support "inherently religious practices such as wor-
ship or proselytization. ''2
These changes only achieved modest success, however, as Chari-
table Choice did not induce the significant partnership between re-
ligion and government for which many politicians had hoped.3
Some commentators claimed the principal reason for the program's
failure was its lack of publicity.34 The program "barely caused a splash
in the American media" and most faith-based organizations were
simply not aware of the legislative changes at all.35 Other critics al-
leged, however, that partisan politics were to blame because Charita-
ble Choice was Republican-driven, and President Bill Clinton and the
36Democrats simply ignored its existence. Regardless of the reason,
the lack of attention paid to Charitable Choice led to little real
change in how the government provided assistance.
' Stanley W. Carlson-Thies, Charitable Choice: Bringing Religion Back into American Welfare, in
RELIGION RETURNS TO THE PUBLIC SQUARE: FAITH AND POLICY IN AMERICA 269, 280 (Hugh He-
clo & Wilfred M. McClay eds., 2003).
' See Elbert Lin et al., Faith in the Courts? The Legal and Political Future of Federally-Funded
Faith-Based Initiatives, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 183, 187 (2002) ("Over time, politicians favoring
faith-based initiatives grew increasingly committed to the proposition that faith-based entities
are effective precisely because of their use of faith in service provision.").
so See Carlson-Thies, supra note 28, at 280.
See id. at 280-81.
2 Id. at 281.
" See Lin et al., supra note 29, at 188.
s' Id.
I d.
See Ryden & Polet, supra note 3, at 3 ("Absent a determined effort on the part of the ex-
ecutive branch to educate and press state governments to implement charitable choice, most
public officials remained in the dark about the requirements of charitable choice, or if they
knew about it, had a seriously misguided understanding of it. Studies revealed that only a
handful of states made any serious effort to pursue charitable choice. In sum, implementation
at the state level was sporadic at best and nonexistent at worst.").
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This all changed in 2001, however, when the presidential spotlight
finally shifted to shine on Charitable Choice ideas. In March of that
year, President George W. Bush established the White House Office
of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives (OFBCI) .3  According to
the President, the purpose of this new office was to "enlist, equip, en-
able, empower, and expand the work of faith-based and other com-
munity organizations to the extent permitted by law."39 To the bene-
fit of many religious organizations that had traditionally provided
disaster relief without the help of federal funds, the White House
OFBCI was very successful in its first few years. By the end of 2003,
the office had paid out over $1.1 billion in federal money to religious
organizations, hundreds of which were first-time grantees. This was
a significant increase in the number of participating religious organi-
zations, and it marked a new high in the total amount paid to such
groups.' Furthermore, it served as evidence of the administration's
efforts to reshape the American perception about the possibility of a
partnership between religious organizations and the federal govern-
ment.
42
As many commentators have recently recognized, however, the ul-
timate test for the White House OFBCI is not whether the program
receives support from the public.43 Rather, the success of the office
depends far more on the legal support it receives when its "vigilant
faith-based opponents" inevitably challenge its existence in court.
44
See id. (describing President Bush's focus on faith-based legislation).
Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8499 (Jan. 29, 2001). In accompanying executive
orders, this program was expanded to include Centers for Faith-Based and Community Initia-
tives in ten federal agencies. Exec. Order No. 13,342, 69 Fed. Reg. 31,509 (June 1, 2004); Exec.
Order No. 13,280, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,145 (Dec. 16, 2002); Exec. Order No. 13,198, 66 Fed. Reg.
8497 (Jan. 29, 2001).
Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. at 8499.
o Ryden & Polet, supra note 3, at 4.
41 See id.
42 Id. at 5 ("Concerted efforts by the current administration indeed may have begun to re-
shape how bureaucratic cultures perceive faith-based organizations as potential partners .... If
a central aim of the Bush plan was to increase the presence of religious groups in the delivery of
government social services, the initiative must bejudged a legitimate success.").
'3 See id. In fact, public support for the program, although slipping some in four years, has
remained relatively steady. In a 2005 poll by The Pew Research Center, sixty-six percent of
Americans still favored allowing churches and other houses of worship to apply for government
funding to provide social services. THE PEW RESEARCH CENTER, PUBLIC DIVIDED ON ORIGINS OF
LIFE: RELIGION A STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS FOR BOTH PARTIES, Aug. 30, 2005,
http://peoplepress.org/reports/display.php3?PageID=988.
" Ryden & Polet, supra note 3, at 5 ("A legal landscape that previously was free of lawsuits
pre-2000 is now speckled with potentially significant cases and developments. On one hand,
advocacy groups and faith-based opponents have turned aggressively to litigation in an effort to
stem the tide of greater church-state interaction. On the flip side, religious providers and con-
servative public interest law firms are litigating issues pertaining to organizational rights the
faith-based organizations hope to retain as government contractees.").
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FEMA's response to the hurricanes provides a significant opportunity
for such a challenge, and its outcome will likely affect the future of
the OFBCI and its policies. Accordingly, it is necessary to next exam-
ine exactly how such a legal challenge would take shape.
III. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND GOVERNMENT FUNDING OF
RELIGIOUS AND FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS
If FEMA's actions in response to the hurricanes were ever chal-
lenged in court, the most likely legal claim against the agency would
be an alleged Establishment Clause violation.5 The Establishment
Clause appears in the First Amendment of the United States Consti-
tution and states simply: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion .... 6 The boundaries of the Establish-
ment Clause are greatly undefined, however, and uncertainty sur-
rounds the extent to which the Supreme Court will permit interac-
tion between government and religion. This determination has
become increasingly important, as it will play a crucial role in deter-
mining the success of the White House OFBCI and other Charitable
Choice programs. Therefore, to determine the constitutionality of
FEMA's recent actions, it is necessary to analyze the uncertainty of
the Establishment Clause by examining its historical development.
A. Funding Religiously Affiliated Social Service Providers: Bradfield v.
Roberts and Bowen v. Kendrick
Throughout its history, although the federal government has
granted money to a wide variety of religious organizations, surpris-
ingly there have been only two Supreme Court disputes involving en-
tities other than religious schools.4 7 These cases, Bradfield v. Roberts8
and Bowen v. Kendrick,'9 are especially relevant to the purposes here,
for many of the issues facing FEMA will involve organizations other
than schools.
In 1899, the Supreme Court first decided in Bradfield v. Roberts
that the government's financial support of a religiously affiliated so-
cial service provider, a hospital run by the Roman Catholic Church,
did not violate the Establishment Clause. ° In coming to this deci-
" For scholarly writing about other potential challenges including free speech, anti-
discrimination, and free exercise claims, see generally Lin et al., supra note 29, at 196, and Lupu
& Tuttle, supra note 2, at 15.
" U.S. CONST. amend. I.
41 MONSMA, supra note 1, at 40.
" 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
49 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
w 175 U.S. at 300.
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sion, the Court highlighted the limited, secular purTose of the hospi-
tal to care for the sick people of Washington, D.C. The Court also
emphasized that there were no allegations that the hospital confined
its services to members of the Roman Catholic Church. Under
these circumstances, "[w]hether the individuals who composed the
[hospital] ... happen to be all Roman Catholics.. . or members of
any other religious organization ... [was] of not the slightest conse-
quence" to the Court.53 Rather, because the hospital was ultimately
subject to the supervision of the government due to its incorporation
pursuant to an act of Congress, it was irrelevant whether any church
or religion had influence on the hospital's employees, and furnishing
it with government funds did not violate the Establishment Clause.54
In 1988, the Court revisited the issue in more depth when it de-
cided Bowen v. Kendrick.55 Bowen involved a challenge to the Adoles-
cent Family Life Act (AFLA), a program passed by Congress to miti-
gate the "severe adverse health, social, and economic consequences"
56of unmarried pregnancy and childbirth. Under AFLA, the federal
government provided grants to nonprofit organizations for their ser-
vices and research in adolescent sexual relations, pregnancy care, and
57prevention. A group of federal taxpayers challenged the program
however, claiming AFLA violated the Establishment Clause both on
its face and as applied because a number of the grantees were organi-
zations with ties to religious denominations.
58
To the benefit of the participating organizations, the Court de-
termined that AFLA was not unconstitutional on its face. 59 In coming
to this decision, much like in Bradfield, the Court again placed a great
deal of importance on the program's secular purpose. Because the
Court found no evidence suggesting that Congress's actual purpose
was one of endorsing religion, it concluded that AFLA was appropri-
ately motivated "primarily, if not entirely, by [the] legitimate secular
Id. at 299-300.
' Id. at 298.
53 Id.
Id.
487 U.S. 589.
Id. at 593. The Court noted that "Congress expressly recognized that legislative or gov-
ernmental action alone would be insufficient: 'Such problems are best approached through a
variety of integrated and essential services provided to adolescents and their families by other
family members, religious and charitable organizations, voluntary associations, and other
groups in the private sector as well as services provided by publicly sponsored initiatives.'" Id. at
595 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300z(a) (8) (B)).
17 Id. at 594-95 n.2 (listing the services which grantees may provide).
Id. at 597.
Id. at 593.
Id. at 603 (explaining that the statute is motivated by secular concerns-"problems of ado-
lescent sexuality").
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purpose" stated in the statute.6' In addition, the Court also deter-
mined that AFLA was permissible because "a fairly wide spectrum of
organizations [was] eligible to... receive funding" and nothing sug-
gested that AFLA was "anything but neutral with respect to the
grantee's status as a sectarian or purely secular institution.,
62
As a warning, however, the Court also acknowledged that even
under a facially neutral statute such as AFLA, there was still the possi-
bility that sectarian organizations could use the federal funds im-
properly to advance their religious missions.63 To the Court, though,
the mere possibility that religious organizations could use the grants
improperly was not sufficient to invalidate the entire program.
Rather, the protective measures included in AFLA were satisfactory
safeguards,'5 and a better solution for the disposition of the case was
to remand it for a determination of any particularly questionable
grants.
66
In its entirety, then, Bowen was as much a success for religious or-
ganizations as it was a warning. In one sense, the Court reaffirmed
the principle that the Establishment Clause was not a blanket prohi-
bition against religious organizations receiving federal funds for their
involvement in publicly funded social welfare programs. 67 This was a
significant victory for faith-based organizations because according to
Bowen's reasoning, a facial challenge of a secularly motivated and
neutral welfare program would virtually never be successful. 6'
As a word of caution, however, the Court also held that lower
courts should strictly scrutinize even neutral social welfare programs
"as applied." Proper separation between the organizations' secular
and sectarian missions remained essential for constitutionality, and
the Court warned that it would continue to "[strike] down programs
that entail an unacceptable risk that government funding would be
"' Specifically, the Court recognized that this secular purpose was the "elimination or reduc-
tion of social and economic problems caused by teenage sexuality, pregnancy, and parent-
hood." Id. at 602.
6' Id. at 608.
63 Id. at 610.
Id. at 611.
6 Id. at 615 ("The application requirements of the Act... require potential grantees to dis-
close in detail exactly what services they intend to provide and how they will be provided. These
provisions, taken together, create a mechanism whereby the Secretary can police the grants that
are given out under the Act to ensure that federal funds are not used for impermissible pur-
poses." (citations omitted)).
6 Id.
67 See id. at 609 (affirming that the Supreme Court "has never held religious institutions are
disabled by the First Amendment from participating in publicly sponsored social welfare pro-
grams").
6 See Lin et al., supra note 29, at 200 (discussing Bowen's precedent for Establishment Clause
challenges).
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used to 'advance the religious mission' of the religious institution re-
ceiving aid."
69
Bowen's limited focus on AFLA, however, unfortunately provided
little guidance about how to determine when there was an unaccept-
able risk of advancing religion. As a result, clarification of this issue
requires examination of other, more developed strings of Establish-
ment Clause cases as well.
B. Government Funding of Parochial Schools
One area in which the Supreme Court has given considerable at-
tention to the Establishment Clause is the presence of public funding
in religious schools. Similar to the doctrine applied to other social
service providers, the Court has never mandated total separation be-
tween the government and parochial schools. 7  Rather, historically
the Court has interTreted the Establishment Clause as a question of
permissible degree.' To complete its construction of this sliding
standard, however, the Court made a series of important decisions in
a line of cases stretching back more than thirty years.
1. The Lemon Benchmark
The Court first articulated its standard for analyzing Establish-
ment Clause violations in parochial schools in 1971 when it decided
Lemon v. Kurtzman.72 In Lemon, the Court determined the constitu-
tionality of programs in Rhode Island and Pennsylvania that reim-
bursed religious schools for the cost of teachers' salaries and supplies
in the instruction of secular subjects. 73 In coming to the conclusion
that both of the programs violated the Constitution,4 the Court out-
lined a three-part test to be used generally in analyzing potential Es-
tablishment Clause violations.75 Under this standard, to pass constitu-
tional muster, a statute or government program must: first, have a
secular legislative purpose; second, as its principal or primary effect,
Bowen, 487 U.S. at 612.
70 See Ryden & Polet, supra note 3, at 16-17 (discussing the neutrality movement and citing
cases such as Zorach v. Clauson, in which the Court held that "there could be no absolute separa-
tion between church and state").
71 Id. at 17 (reiterating the Court's concession that "there... be some allowable contact be-
tween church and state ... ."). In fact, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court went as far as to say that
"U]udicial caveats against entanglement must recognize that the line of separation, far from
being a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances
of a particular relationship." 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
7' 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
73 Id. at 606-11.
7" Id. at 625.
75 Id. at 612.
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neither advance nor inhibit religion; and third, not foster an exces-
76
sive entanglement between government and religion.
The creation of this new test was beneficial to the Court because it
consolidated the various criteria previously used to decide Establish-
ment Clause violations.77 In addition, it also protected against the
"three main evils" that the Establishment Clause was intended to
prohibit, particularly the government's "sponsorship, financial sup-
port, and active involvement" in religious activity.7 8  Even with this
new standard, however, the Court candidly acknowledged that the Es-
tablishment Clause still lacked "precisely stated... prohibitions" and
the Justices could "only dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in
this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law., 79 As a conse-
quence, and to the frustration of many religious groups, the Court
continued to remain unfortunately inconsistent and anomalous in
many of its subsequent decisions.80
2. Refining the Lemon Test: Agostini v. Felton
To clarify these ambiguous results, in 1997 the Supreme Court
modified the Lemon test with its decision in Agostini v. Felton."' In
Agostini, a group of petitioners challenged a longstanding injunction
of a federally funded education program." Based on the Court's in-
terpretation of the Establishment Clause in Aguilar, the government
was forbidden from paying public school teachers to provide reme-
dial instruction to disadvantaged children at parochial schools .
3
Claiming that subsequent decisions had severely undermined the
original reasoning for the injunction, the petitioners argued for relief
and insisted the original decision should be overruled.8
76 Id. at 612-13. In analyzing whether entanglement is excessive, the Court created a second
three-part test which examined the character and purposes of the institutions that are bene-
fited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the
government and the religious authority. Id. at 615.
77 Id. at 612 (giving effect to the "cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many
years").
78 Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
79 id.
' See Ryden & Polet, supra note 3, at 17 (discussing how the Court's excessive entanglement
prong produced a variety of contrary results such as its decision in Tilton v. Richardson, wherein
a law "providing secular aid to private colleges was upheld even though it was virtually the same
law struck down in Lemon").
SI 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
The Court was revisiting its decision in Aguilarv. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
n See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 209-10 (outlining Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Educa-
tion Act of 1965, which sets forth the requirements for governmental aid).
I Id. at 215-16 (relying on subsequent decisions and the fact that a majority of current jus-
tices believed Aguilar should be overruled).
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Agreeing with the petitioners and acknowledging that the legal
landscape had changed since the original decision, the Court over-
turned the injunction.5 In doing so, the opinion described how the
Court's understanding of the Lemon test had transformed since its in-
ception."6 The Court explained that although the broad principles
underlying its Establishment Clause decisions had stayed constant
throughout the years, the criteria to assess whether government aid
has an impermissible "'effect' of advancing ... religion" had not.87
Therefore, to better tailor the standard, the Court altered the tra-
ditional Lemon test. Subsequently, when determining the second "ef-
fects" prong, the Court would examine whether the aid resulted in
governmental indoctrination, whether it defined its recipients by ref-
erence to religion, and whether it created excessive entanglements. 8
These new criteria superseded both the second and third prongs of
the original Lemon test, and they became, along with the surviving
"purpose" prong, 9 the Court's new Establishment Clause standard.
In altering its interpretation, the Court also limited the traditional
prohibitions of the Establishment Clause in multiple ways. First, the
Court reiterated its belief that providing publicly funded services on a
religious organization's property would inevitably result in state-
sponsored indoctrination.9 0  Rather, the Court adopted a presump-
tion that even in such a sectarian environment, properly instructed
employees would discharge their duties in a manner that did not
promote religion.9 Second, the Court rejected the belief that the
government advanced religion if individuals made a decision to use
federal funds to finance inherently religious activities. 9 To the con-
trary, the Court held that this type of indirect financing was not at-
' Id. at 237.
Id. at 232 (observing how Lemon's entanglement prong inquired into the same factors as
the effects prong).
Id. at 223.
Id. at 233-34.
The first prong asks whether there is a valid secular legislative purpose for the federal aid,
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971), and remains unchanged by Agostini v. Felton, 521
U.S. at 223 ("[W]e continue to ask whether the government acted with the purpose of advanc-
ing or inhibiting religion, and the nature of that inquiry has remained largely unchanged.").
90 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 223 (citing Zobrest for the proposition that the Establishment Clause
does not bar the placement of a public employee in a sectarian school). This decision also
served to overrule, and thereby clarify the meaning of School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473
U.S. 373 (1985).
" Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234.
92 The Court analogized the school grants to a state paying an employee with the knowledge
that some or all of the check would be donated to a religious institution. Under such circum-
stances, "any money that ultimately went to religious institutions did so 'only as a result of the
genuinely independent and private choices of' individuals." Id. at 226 (quoting Witters v. Wash.
Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487 (1986)).
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tributable to the decision making of the state. 93 Finally, the Court
abandoned the idea that "pervasive monitoring" was indicative of ex-
cessive entanglement under the Establishment Clause.94 In fact, quite
the opposite, the Court held that even if administrative cooperation
was required for the success of a program, this did not create imper-
missible entanglements that would invalidate the program alto-
gether.95
3. The Importance of Neutrality and True Private Choice: Mitchell v.
Helms and Zelman v. Simmons-Harris
The Court continued in its efforts to clarify the Lemon test early
this decade when it decided Mitchell v. Helms. Mitchell involved a
school aid program in which the federal government distributed
money to supply educational materials to both public and private
schools.97 Much like in Agostini and Lemon, the petitioners challenged
the program because it provided funding to religiously affiliated
schools. Unlike the prior cases, however, Mitchell provided a more
significant legal challenge as the government allocated the money di-
rectly to the religious schools rather than to its teachers. As a result,
the program provided government funding to religious organizations
that were "pervasively sectarian" in nature and historically precluded
from this type of assistance. 99
In determining that the program did not violate the Establish-
ment Clause, however, the Court clarified two of the new factors from
Agostini: whether aid results in governmental indoctrination and
whether a program defines its recipients by reference to religion.
With respect to both of these criteria, the Court explained that re-
gardless of whether federal aid reaches a religious organization di-
rectly or not, no indoctrination or incentive to indoctrinate is attrib-
utable to the government if the funding was both religiously neutral
in terms of its recipients'00 and based upon true private choice. 10' In
" Id. at 226 (quoting Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 501 U.S. 1, 10 (1993)).
94 Id. at 234 (stating that pervasive monitoring only inferred entanglement under the now
obsolete assumption that public employees would tend to inculcate religion if placed in secular
schools).
9 Id. at 233.
530 U.S. 793 (2000).
97 Id. at 801.
98 Id.
9 The Court first recognized this in Lemon when it supported the District Court's conclusion
that "the parochial school system was 'an integral part of the religious mission of the Catholic
Church.'" Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 609 (1971) (internal citations omitted).
'o See Mitchell 530 U.S. at 809 ("In distinguishing between indoctrination that is attributable
to the State and indoctrination that is not, we have consistently turned to the principle of neu-
trality, upholding aid that is offered to a broad range of groups or persons without regard to
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other words, the Court held that "[i]f aid to schools, even 'direct aid,'
is neutrally available and, before reaching or benefiting any religious
school, first passes through the hands (literally or figuratively) of
numerous private citizens who are free to direct the aid elsewhere,
the government has not provided any 'support of religion.' 1 0 2 Ac-
cordingly, as the program in Mitchell neutrally allocated money based
on the number of children enrolled in each school, a decision ulti-
mately made by the parents, the funding satisfied both of these sub-
elements. 
103
Equally as important to the development of the Establishment
Clause, the Court in Mitchell also repudiated its longstanding belief
that the Constitution forbade "pervasively sectarian" organizations
from receiving federal funding altogether. 1I In making this decision,
the opinion reasoned simply, "nothing in the Establishment Clause
requires the exclusion of pervasively sectarian schools from otherwise
permissible aid programs .... ,,05 The Court also stated that the doc-
trine was "born of bigotry," and that it was high time to bury such a. ... . 106
traditionally anti-Catholic policy. Regardless of the reasoning, how-
ever, the religious character of a recipient organization was thereafter
immaterial to the Court when making Establishment Clause deci-
sions. This was a significant change in the Court's jurisprudence, and
some scholars have gone so far as to denote it as Mitchell's most im-
portant legacy.
1
0
7
their religion. If the religious, irreligious, and areligious are all alike eligible for governmental
aid, no one would conclude that any indoctrination that any particular recipient conducts has
been done at the behest of the government.").
'o See id. at 810 ("As a way of assuring neutrality, we have repeatedly considered whether any
governmental aid that goes to a religious institution does so 'only as a result of the genuinely
independent and private choices of individuals.' We have viewed as significant whether the
'private choices of individual parents,' as opposed to the 'unmediated' will of government de-
termine what schools ultimately benefit from the governmental aid, and how much." (citations
omitted)).
102 Id. at 816 (citation and punctuation omitted).
'0' Id. at 813 (stating that the decisions of individual parents does not confer an "imprimatur
of state approval" on any religion).
l Id. at 829 (citing Hunt v. McNair, 413. U.S. 734, 743 (1973)). In defense of the doctrine,
however, the Court also recognized that "there was a period when this factor mattered, particu-
larly if the pervasively sectarian school was a primary or secondary school. But that period is
one that the Court should regret, and it is thankfully long past." Id. at 826 (citations omitted).
'0' Id. at 829.
106 Id.
107 See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 2, at 25 ("Mitchells unmistakable legacy.., is the abandon-
ment of organizational character as a conclusive determinant of eligibility for government sup-
port.").
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It is important to note, however, that only a plurality decided
Mitchell" Rather than joining a majority, Justice O'Connor authored
a concurring opinion disapproving of the other Justices' treatment of
neutrality. 09 In particular, she claimed the other Justices in the plu-
rality came "close to assigning [neutrality] singular importance
in... Establishment Clause challenges," and this worried her because
she believed that the "genuinely independent and private choice"
of aid recipients was more important.' As a consequence of this dis-
agreement, the precedential value of the Court's decision is ques-
tionable, especially with respect to the relative importance of neutral-
ity and true individual choice. Furthermore, the Court has failed to
address this uncertainty in its subsequent decisions.
For example, the Court declined to clarify the relative importance
of the two factors during its next significant Establishment Clause
challenge in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris."2 In Zelman, the Court deter-
mined that an Ohio education program that provided tuition grants
for students attending public or private schools of their parents'
choice was constitutional. 1 3 The grants were distributed strictly ac-
cording to the financial need of the students, and if the parents se-
lected a private school, the checks were made payable to the parents
who then endorsed them over to the chosen school."
4
In upholding the program, instead of basing its decision on one
factor or the other, the Court examined the "effects" prong using
both neutrality and true private choice principles. 1'5 The Court held:
[W]here a government aid program is neutral with respect to religion,
and provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn,
direct government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their own
genuine and independent private choice, the proram is not readily sub-
ject to challenge under the Establishment Clause.
" ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy joined Justice Thomas's plurality
opinion. Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Breyerjoined. Justices
Souter, Stevens, and Ginsburg dissented.
,0 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. at 836 (O'Connor,J, concurring).
110 Id. at 837, 841 (quoting Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487
(1986)).
... Justice O'Connor argued that the Court had "never held that a government-aid program
passes constitutional muster solely because of the neutral criteria it employs as a basis for distrib-
uting aid" and neutrality was merely "one of several factors" the Court had traditionally used in
determining the constitutionality of government-aid programs. Id. at 839.
" 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
Id. at 653.
11 Id. at 646.
15 Id. at 652. The Court also examined the aid program to determine whether it had a valid
secular purpose to fulfill the first prong of its Establishment Clause analysis. Id. at 649. Con-
spicuously missing, however, was any mention of the "entanglement" prong, thereby signifying
again its likely obsolescence within Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
' Id. at 652.
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Therefore, because the grant program conferred educational assis-
tance neutrally to a broad class of individuals who directed it to the
individual schools, the program met both of these criteria."' In up-
holding the program on these grounds, however, the Court did little
to address the uncertainty in its jurisprudence.
The Court left many other troubling issues for another day as well.
Most importantly, the Court failed to answer whether true private
choice requires government money to actually pass through the
hands of a beneficiary."8 The Court also failed to explain whether
duress or limited capacity affect an individual's ability to make a true
private choice." 9 The cases argued since Zelman unfortunately have
yet to involve facts necessary to address these uncertainties. As a re-
sult, as long as these questions remain unanswered, Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion from Mitchell will continue to have
relevance in evaluating Establishment Clause violations.
C. The Modern Establishment Clause Standard
Viewing this long string of cases in its entirety, the current frame-
work for the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause standard be-
comes somewhat clear. Although the Court's traditional Bowen analy-
sis for evaluating religious social service providers remains good law,
the Court is unlikely to apply it due to the extensive developments
made in Establishment Clause jurisprudence through cases involving
parochial schools. Instead, the Court will likely use the refined Lemon
test from Agostini rather than Bowen, regardless of whether a case in-
volves religious schools or not. As a consequence, when the Court
evaluates the constitutionality of a program funding religious organi-
zations, it will ask three principal questions in making its decision:
(1) whether there is a valid secular purpose; (2) whether the aid re-
sults in government indoctrination; and (3) whether there are finan-
cial incentives that would favor religious organizations.
In answering the second two of these questions, the Court will
likely use both neutrality and true private choice as dispositive factors.
The extent to which the Court will require true private choice, how-
ever, remains unsettled. Undoubtedly, the Justices are more likely to
approve of a funding program that provides vouchers or money di-
rectly to beneficiaries rather than to religious organizations. Never-
", In effect, the program is one of "true private choice," which the Court had "never
found.., to offend the Establishment Clause." Id. at 653.
.. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 2, at 27 (framing the unanswered question as whether Zel-
man would allow programs that make payments directly to providers).
"9 See id. at 28.
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theless, the Court has never made this an explicit requirement for its
Establishment Clause standard.
IV. POTENTIAL ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CHALLENGES IN THE WAKE OF
HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA
Turning now from the state of the law to the circumstances cur-
rently facing the government: in August 2005, FEMA took unprece-
dented action when it announced its plan to reimburse churches and
other religious organizations for providing shelter and aid to the vic-
tims of the hurricanes.120 Many opponents of the plan quickly criti-
cized the agency's decision, claiming it was merely the government's
attempt to "restore its battered reputation by playing to religious con-
servatives." 2 1 Civil liberties groups also criticized the decision alleg-
ing it was a blatant violation of the Establishment Clause.122
In support of the government's actions, however, several academ-
ics rebutted these attacks and stated simply that there was "noth-
ing.., constitutionally troubling" about FEMA's reimbursement pro-
gram. 12 And true enough, there have yet to be any legal challenges
to the relief program to date. 24 Accordingly, the rest of this part. will
analyze the Establishment Clause challenges that may indeed exist
and the probability of their success.
A. Directing Generosity: FEMA 's Prominent Feature of "Operation Blessing"
and Other Religious Charities
To take advantage of the generosity of the American public fol-
lowing the hurricanes, FEMA quickly compiled and disseminated a
list of reputable charities to which citizens could direct their mone-
tary donations. 25  Near the top of this list, FEMA prominently fea-
tured Operation Blessing, a sixty-six million dollars-a-year humanitar-
See Cooperman & Williamson, supra note 6.
2 Id.
See id. (stating that civil liberties groups called the decision a "violation of the traditional
boundary between church and state"); see also Americans United, supra note 12 (claiming that
the FEMA efforts are "too open-ended and could leave storm victims vulnerable to aggressive
proselytism").
123 Adelle Banks, FEMA s Plan to Reimburse Churches Draws Criticism, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Oct.
18, 2005, at 13, available at 2005 WLNR 17458401 (quoting Robert Turtle, a law professor at the
George Washington University Law School and analyst for the Roundtable on Religion and So-
cial Welfare Policy).
1' This Comment was completed, and therefore up-to-date, in September 2006.
,15 See Press Release, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Cash Sought To Help Hurri-
cane Victims, Volunteers Should Not Self-Dispatch (Aug. 29, 2005) available at
http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=18473 [hereinafter Federal Emergency Man-
agement Agency].
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ian group headed by religious mogul Pat Robertson. 6 To accom-
pany Operation Blessing and various other religious groups also men-
tioned on the list, however, FEMA included only two nonreligious or-
ganizations. 1 2  As a result, when media outlets duly reprinted and
disseminated the list, critics claimed various news agencies like the
New York Times and the Associated Press became unwitting agents in
an effort to solicit cash for Robertson and the other religious128
groups. This solicitation was no small matter either, as experts sus-
pected the prominent featuring by FEMA yielded millions of dollars
for these religious groups. 29  The issue that remains to be deter-
mined, then, is whether this type of prominent and preferential fea-
turing constitutes a violation of the Establishment Clause.""
Looking at the issue first under the Supreme Court's traditional
analysis from Bowen, the answer seems rather clear. In Bowen, the
Court held that a social welfare program did not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause if it had a legitimate secular purpose,3 and was neu-
tral with respect to the participating beneficiaries' sectarian or secu-
lar status. Here, FEMA met both of these requirements.
Petitioning for money to fund hurricane relief clearly constitutes a
valid secular purpose, and there is nothing to suggest that the gov-
ernment did not give a wide spectrum of qualified organizations the
same opportunity to be included on the list. The fact that FEMA fea-
tured a secular organization-the American Red Cross-as the first
charity on the list only reinforces this conclusion.'
3 3
If the Court also chose to analyze the issue under the standard it
developed in its parochial school cases, the most likely conclusion is
that it is still constitutional. Under the refined Lemon test from
' See, e.g., Max Blumenthal, Pat Robertson's Katrina Cash, THE NATION, Sept. 7, 2005, available
at http://www.thenation.com/doc/20050919/blumenthal (noting that FEMA's relief efforts
brought about a monetary windfall to Pat Robertson and his charitable organization, Operation
Blessing). Operation Blessing was second only to the American Red Cross on the list of chari-
ties accepting donations. Brian Ross, Some Question Robertson's Katrina Charity, ABC NEWS, Sept.
9, 2005, available at http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/print?id=l 112518.
127 SeeBlumenthal, supra note 126.
's See id.
See Ross, supra note 126.
'3 See Freedom from Religion Foundation, supra note 12 (arguing that the decision to
prominently feature Operation Blessing along with many other religious charities was "constitu-
tionally a river of no return").
"' See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 602-03 (1988) ("[A] court may invalidate a statute
only if it is motivated wholly by an impermissible purpose .... .").
132 See id. at 608 (examining whether eligibility for funding depends on the grantee's status as
a secular or sectarian organization).
'" Federal Emergency Management Agency, supra note 125. There are also other nonreli-
gious organizations now included such as the Corporation for National and Community Service
Disaster Relief Fund, Feed the Children, America's Second Harvest, and the Humane Society of
the United States. See id.
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Agostini, the Court will require that in addition to having a valid secu-
lar purpose, the government action in question must not result in in-
doctrination nor create financial incentives favoring religious
groups. 34 In evaluating these questions, neutrality and true private
choice are both essential factors. With the inclusion of both secular
and sectarian groups based on their skills and qualifications, however,
the list seems to have been compiled according to neutral criteria. In
addition, because the donations are a private decision made by indi-
vidual donors, there is also no claim that true private choice is absent.
As a result, because the list meets both of these criteria, it is unlikely
that a court would deem FEMA's action to be a violation.
As one last possible challenge based on the featuring of religious
groups, critics could argue that FEMA's inclusion of considerably
more religious groups on the list than nonreligious ones demon-
strates a preference for religion in violation of the Establishment
Clause. Under a recent case argued before the D.C. Circuit, however,
this contention does not seem to be a sustainable challenge. In
American Jewish Congress v. Corp. for National and Community Service, the
court held that "[a] program may be one of 'true private choice' even
when more religious than non-religious choices are available."36 For
this holding to apply, however, the court was clear that there must be
sufficient evidence that (1) there were numerous religious and secu-
lar choices and (2) no participant was "imp ermissibly channeled" to a
religious group against his or her wishes.
In the circumstances here, with the American Red Cross serving as
one of the secular relief organizations originally included in the list,
there was not an absence of reputable nonreligious choices. Fur-
thermore, there have been no reports alleging that any donations to
secular organizations on FEMA's list were diverted to a religious
group. Therefore, because both of these additional criteria are satis-
fied, the ratio between religious and nonreligious charities on the list
is likely irrelevant for Establishment Clause purposes.
1 See generally Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 640 (2002) (discussing a govern-
ment educational program that did not create financial incentives favoring religious groups);
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 812 (2000).
"5 See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652 (using both neutrality and true private choice as criteria in the
Court's analysis of Establishment Clause violation).
136 See Am. Jewish Cong. v. Corp. for Nat'l & Cmty. Serv., 399 F.3d 351, 358 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(discussing circumstances in Zelman where eighty-two percent of the eligible private schools par-
ticipating in the voucher program were religious schools but nevertheless the program was
deemed neutral and based on true private choice).
'37 Id. (asking only whether aid went to a religious organization as a result of "genuine and
private choice").
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B. Proselytizing Providers: Unconstitutionally Mixing Religious Activities
with Relief Efforts
A second and far more likely challenge to the federal response to
the hurricanes concerns FEMA's program to reimburse religious or-
ganizations for providing services during the relief effort. Not long
after the reimbursement program's initiation, the government's deci-
sion to fund these sectarian organizations came under attack by civil
liberties groups.13 Representing the views of many of these watchdog
organizations, Reverend' Berry Lynn, the director of Americans
United for Separation of Church and State, condemned the reim-
bursement program, arguing it was both far "too open-ended" and
left storm victims "vulnerable to aggressive proselytism."'' 39 In addi-
tion, he also claimed that numerous religious organizations were
"openly using the hurricane relief efforts to win new converts."' 4
Although some of these and other similar claims are likely false
exaggerations, there is still a strong possibility that one of the civil
liberties groups might nevertheless eventually challenge the reim-
bursement program, arguing that it violates the Establishment
Clause. The outcome of this lawsuit would have a large impact on
many religious groups, as an injunction barring any further reim-
bursement might have devastating effects on their financial security.
To determine whether a lawsuit of this kind would be successful,
however, one must first take a closer look at the program itself and
the various ways the federal money was or could be spent.
1. The Current Reimbursement Program
Under the current reimbursement program, religious and faith-
based organizations can seek reimbursement from FEMA for ex-
penses associated with providing aid to those affected by the hurri-141
canes. Among these covered costs, the reimbursement program
will repay religious groups for supplying a variety of necessities such
as food, water, shelter, and medical supplies. 42 While providing these
' Americans United, supra note 12 (criticizing FEMA "for its plan to fund hurricane relief
by churches without adequate accountability and safeguards to protect the evacuees" from
proselytism).
139 Id.
14 Id.
,4' See Memorandum from Nancy Ward, Director, Recovery Area Command (FEMA), to Fed-
eral Coordinating Officers (Sept. 9, 2005), available at http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/
docs/policy/FEMA reimbursementmemoSept%209-2005.pdf (discussing how the President
made "[flederal assistance immediately available to State and local governments [and certain
private non-profits] for 100% of eligible costs they incur to provide shelter and care to Katrina's
victims").
1 Id. at 2.
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types of services would not usually invoke concerns about violating
the Establishment Clause, critics of the program claim religious
groups went about these activities in such a way as to violate the con-
stitutional rights of the beneficiaries.
43
For example, one commonly reported problem during the relief
effort was the practice of some sectarian organizations to proselytize
and distribute Bibles and other religious items while providing food
and water to victims and relief workers.144 Also raising concern was
the dual roles that many churches, synagogues, and mosques played,
serving as both sanctuaries for religious worship as well as housing for
an estimated 500,000 displaced victims.' 45 Fearful that practices like
these compromised the constitutional rights of the victims, one civil
liberties group advocated the view that "if [religious organizations]
can't separate their evangelism from their relief work, they should
not be eligible for public funding.'
46
In this limited respect, the critics of the reimbursement program
are indeed correct. As the Court stated in Lemon, "the Establishment
Clause was intended to afford protection [from] 'sponsorship, finan-
cial supRort, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious ac-
tivity.' Therefore, even if the religious groups have a legitimate
secular purpose underlying the relief activities, the government can-
not directly fund them if the groups inescapably intertwine the aid
with proselytizing.
As a result, the federal government must require sufficient safe-
guards in the reimbursement program to ensure proper separation
between the relief efforts and religious activities.' Fortunately for
FEMA, however, because the organizations that provided aid will have
incurred nearly all of the claimed expenses by the time they seek re-
"' See IRA C. LUPu & ROBERT W. TUTTLE, THE STATE OF THE LAW 2005: LEGAL
DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND FAITH-BASED
ORGANIZATIONS 22-23 (2005), available at http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/homepage/
State_of_theLaw_2005.pdf (noting that faith-based organizations must have in place "adequate
safeguards to prevent the diversion of public funds into religious activities" and scrutinizing the
constitutionality of FEMA's reimbursement program).
'" See Cooperman & Williamson, supra note 6 (discussing one religious group's practice of
bundling Bibles and tracts in packages of food or clothing distributed to the hurricane victims);
Americans United, supra note 12 (citing instances where religious organizations were proselytiz-
ing while distributing food and water, distributing gift bags with evangelistic tracts and a stuffed
lamb that plays "Jesus Loves Me" to displaced children, and placing tracts on the pillows of re-
lief workers at their shelters each night).
"4 Cooperman & Williamson, supra note 6.
46 Americans United, supra note 12.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664, 668 (1970)).
1' See LuPU & TUTTLE, supra note 143, at 23 (discussing the constitutional issues regarding
the segregation of religious activities from FEMA relief).
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payment, minimal safeguards are necessary on a prospective basis.1 49
These religious organizations will submit receipts and a description of
the work they did, and then government officials can determine
whether the claimed expenses meet separation requirements. ° Ac-
cordingly, it should be readily apparent from the reimbursement
documentation whether claimants used federal funds for blatant Es-
tablishment Clause violations such as purchasing and distributing Bi-
bles or other religious texts.
Ensuring that the groups provided their services free from more
subtle religious activities, however, will be much more difficult. As
commentators have pointed out, it is unlikely that the reimbursement
documentation will be able to prove whether religious organizations
provided food and shelter separate from proselytizing or whether
they conditioned the receipt of such things on a victim's participation
in religious activities.' 5' Fraud is always a possibility with retroactive
reimbursement programs, and though religious groups must affirm
in their documentation that they kept any proselytizing strictly sepa-
rate from activities funded by the government, there is a strong like-
lihood that infringing groups would seek funding anyway. To address
these concerns, FEMA has given little guidance. Rather, the agency
decided to entrust local administrators with the responsibility of
monitoring the funding, and it is nearly impossible to determine
whether specific challenges to their decisions would be successful.
2. An Alternative Method: Disaster Relief Vouchers
Looking to improve its delivery of disaster relief in the future,
though, FEMA should avoid these problems altogether by imple-
menting a voucher program to replace its reimbursement strategy. If
structured properly, this type of voucher program would provide a far
more effective method of providing disaster aid without infringing on
the constitutional rights of the recipients. Theoretically, this is be-
cause displaced victims could redeem the vouchers with a variety of
eligible providers, religious or otherwise. 152 A voucher program, then,
, Id. at 25.
Id. The rules dictating the reimbursement policy are based on the Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 5151 (2000), which authorizes and controls federal disaster relief programs. Regulations im-
plementing the Stafford Act require all grantees to "provide a written assurance of their intent
to comply with regulations relating to nondiscrimination." 44 C.F.R. § 206.11 (c) (2005).
'5' See LuPu & TUTrLE, supra note 143, at 26 ("Receipts and other documentation... cannot
show whether the services were intermingled with religious activity, or whether beneficiaries
were required to participate in religious activities in order to receive the services.").
152 Id. at 26 n.54 (indicating that a voucher program may avoid constitutional issues as long
as there is a range of eligible providers, and public funds reach these providers through the
.genuine and independent choice" of beneficiaries).
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would provide disaster victims with the option to avoid unwanted re-
ligious pressure or proselytizing by sectarian groups."'
A voucher program could also withstand a wider variety of legal
challenges. As demonstrated in Zelman and other "private choice"
cases, the Supreme Court has consistently held that vouchers and
other forms of indirect aid are permissible forms of funding under
the Establishment Clause. 154 This applies despite how religious or1 15
nonreligious the providing organization may be, and regardless of
whether the majority-or even entirety-of the federal funds ulti-
mately end up in the coffers of sectarian organizations." Under a
voucher program, "[tihe incidental advancement of a religious mis-
sion, or the perceived endorsement of a religious message, is rea-
sonably attributable to the individual recipient, not to the govern-
ment, whose role ends with the disbursement of benefits." 157 For that
reason, as long as the federal funds reach religious groups only
through the "genuine and independent choices" of the program's re-
cipients, FEMA would not be "constitutionally responsible" under the
Establishment Clause for any financial support of religion.
5 8
To accompany these benefits, however, FEMA's formation of a
voucher program would generate its own set of difficulties. For ex-
ample, for this type of program to be initially successful, there must
be a sufficient stockpile of vouchers for FEMA to distribute at the
time of the next natural disaster. A list of qualified and eligible relief
agencies must also be developed, and the federal government must
construct policies and procedures to regulate both the distribution
and redemption of the vouchers in order to safeguard against poten-
tial fraud.
Furthermore, even if these administrative hurdles have been satis-
fied, opponents could also challenge a voucher program by focusing
on the ambiguous meaning of "true private choice." When only a
'53 In fact, the program in Zelman provided incentives for participants to avoid redeeming
vouchers at religious schools. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 654 (2002) ("[T]he
program [providing tuition vouchers] ... creates financial disincentives for religious schools,
with private schools receiving only half the government assistance given to community schools
and one-third the assistance given to magnet schools.").
See, e.g., id. (upholding a tuition voucher program for participating schools in Cleveland,
OH); see also Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (upholding a program
providing sign-language interpreters to assist deaf children enrolled in religious schools when
the parents had the freedom to select a school of their choice for their child to attend); Witters
v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (upholding a scholarship program
through which recipients could direct state money to religious institutions); Mueller v. Allen,
463 U.S. 388 (1983) (upholding a voluntary Minnesota program granting tax deductions for
educational expenses including parochial school tuition).
.5 LUPU & TUTrLE, supra note 143, at 26 n.54.
See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 658-59.
"' Id. at 652.
LUPU & TuTTLE, supra note 143, at 26 n.54.
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limited number of organizations have the resources and capabilities
to provide disaster relief, there is substantial uncertainty whether vic-
tims have any choice whatsoever, let alone the Supreme Court's defi-
nition of "true private choice," in deciding where to eat, sleep, or re-
ceive medical care.' 59 Without at least one, if not several, secular
alternatives for beneficiaries to choose between, a court would likely
find an absence of this criterion.6 0 Therefore, because it remains un-
settled whether such an absence is legally fatal, this sort of irresolu-
tion leaves even voucher programs susceptible to constitutional chal-
lenge. As a result, FEMA must unfortunately structure any
improvements without the judicial guidance necessary to ensure the
program's lasting success.
C. Rebuilding Education: Displaced Students and Their Destroyed Schools
One final potential challenge to the government's response to the
hurricanes concerns its effort to rebuild the education system of the
Gulf Coast region. This process first began in October 2005 when
FEMA announced that parochial schools and other private, nonprofit
organizations providing "government-type" services would be eligible
for federal grants to rebuild their facilities.' 6' Shortly thereafter,
Congress added its support as well when it proposed a series of bills
to authorize millions of dollars to subsidize religious schools that had
accepted displaced students following the storms.1
6
2
Over a month later, however, Congress had yet to reach a consen-
sus concerning the details of its funding plan. , As a result, various
religious organizations began complaining that the government was
giving them the "runaround" with respect to what sort of financial
,59 See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 2, at 27-28 (asking whether parity between secular and reli-
gious organizations must exist).
'w See also Am. Jewish Cong. v. Corp. for Nat'l & Cmty. Serv., 399 F.3d 351, 358 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (requiring "enough" secular alternatives to satisfy "genuine and independent private
choice" criteria).
6' See Associated Press, White House: Religious Schools Can Get Aid, Oct. 18, 2005, available at
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=15944 (highlighting the White House's
comment that "[the President] believes that hurricanes, floods and earthquakes don't discrimi-
nate on the basis of religion and that government's response to them should not either").
'62 The bill proposed in the U.S. Senate authorized $2.4 billion for an education recovery
plan to aid evacuee students displaced by Hurricane Katrina and would pay up to $6,000 for
tuition and other costs for students who attended religious schools. Press Release, Americans
United for Separation of Church and State, Americans United Opposes Senate Plan to Give
Voucher Aid to Religious Schools (Oct. 20, 2005), available at http://www.au.org/site/
News2?JServSessionIdr006=i2utqm4512.app7b&abbr=pr&page=NewsArticle&id=761 1&security=
1002&newsiv_ctrl=1843.
'0 SeeJulia Duin, Bishops Renew Vow Against Executions But Won't Hold Politicians to It, WASH.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 2005, at A05 (indicating that FEMA's indecision regarding support in rebuild-
ing Catholic schools amounts to a "runaround").
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help its broad policy would permit. '64 In addition, opponents began
to attack the constitutionality of the proposals, claiming they violated
the Establishment Clause. 61 In support of these claims, the critics al-
leged the funding proposals included no effective oversight to ensure
that religious organizations could not use the federal money imper-
missibly to support religious indoctrination.'
66
Assuming that the government properly structures its education
aid programs, however, it is unlikely that any such Establishment
Clause challenges will be successful. This is especially true with re-
spect to tuition reimbursements for which all schools that accepted
displaced children are eligible. In fact, this type of program would be
nearly identical to the tuition reimbursement program affirmed by
the Supreme Court in Zelman.'67 There, the government distributed
vouchers neutrally according to a family's financial need, and both
parochial and public schools were eligible based on the private
choice of the children's parents.' 68 Similarly, in the proposed pro-
gram here, as long as the government distributes the tuition vouchers
according to the students' needs and the vouchers are redeemable at
both public and parochial schools, the program should be equally as
constitutional. This remains true no matter how fiscally robust the
grants may become and regardless of what percentage of the money
ultimately ends up in religious schools by private choice.
69
The question of whether the government can use federal funds to
actually rebuild parochial schools, however, is much more complex.
Rather than relying on legal precedent, the federal government
based this part of its education relief program on a memorandum au-
thored by the Department of Justice ("DOJ") in 2005. In that memo-
randum, the DOJ overturned a long-held position by the federal gov-
ernment that prohibited public money from being used to repair
structures owned by religious entities. 7 ° In doing so, the DOJ argued
68 Id.
E.g., Ralph G. Neas, Don't Subsidize Religion, USA TODAY, Oct. 27, 2005, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2005-10-26-oppose-x.htm (labeling the
congressional bill a violation of the First Amendment's separation of church and state).
66 Id.
167 536 U.S. 639, 644-46 (2002).
68 Id.
67 See id. at 658 ("[Wie have recently found it irrelevant even to the constitutionality of a di-
rect aid program that a vast majority of program benefits went to religious schools.").
170 Memorandum Opinion from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Counsel, to the General Counsel, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Authority of FEMA
to Provide Disaster Assistance to Seattle Hebrew Academy (Sept. 25, 2002), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/FEMAAssistance.htm [hereinafter Authority of FEMA to Provide
Disaster Assistance]. The memo analyzes the Stafford Act to determine whether it permits fed-
eral disaster assistance for a Jewish parochial school after it sustained considerable damage dur-
ing an earthquake in 2001. The opinion concludes "[w]e do not think that providing FEMA
grants to religious institutions that qualify for disaster relief on the basis of wholly neutral crite-
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that changes in the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Establish-
ment Clause made this type of restriction unnecessary, especially
when the federal government dispensed money neutrally to a variety
of entities. 7 The DOJ reasoned that when the government granted
disaster relief to a broad class of beneficiaries providing "essential
services of governmental nature," this served as evidence that the
money was generally intended to support the "rehabilitation of a
community that has suffered great loss from a natural disaster."
72
Any indirect support of religious education was not attributable to
the government, and the funds did not advance government-
sponsored indoctrination.
73
When applied to the circumstances here, however, the DOJ's con-
clusion seems somewhat problematic. This is particularly due to the
inherent differences between schools and other government-like ser-
vice providers such as utility companies, libraries, and police stations.
Unlike providing money to these other service providers, the gov-
ernment's direct funding to rebuild religious schools would carry a
significantly higher risk that the money would be impermissibly di-
verted to support religion. The Supreme Court has long recognized
that "the parochial school system [is] 'an integral part of the religious
mission of the Catholic Church,"' and as such, it would be nearly cer-
tain that participating parochial schools would use the money to ad-
vance their inherently religious agenda and to indoctrinate their stu-
dents. 74 The DOJ even recognized this fundamental problem when it
conceded in its memorandum that "providing FEMA disaster relief to
repair a school used for religious instruction [could] run afoul of Su-
preme Court precedent restricting the use of 'direct' aid that can be
put to specifically religious uses."'
ria-a wide array of nonprofit organizations may receive aid for buildings that have suffered
structural damage from a natural disaster-lacks a secular purpose or effect." Id.
171 Id. These groups include "educational, utility, irrigation, emergency, medical ... [and]
other private nonprofit facilities which provide essential services of a governmental nature to
the general public." Id. (quoting 44 C.F.R. § 206.221 (e) (2001)).
172 Id.
173 In fact, there are also arguments that "excluding [such] religious organizations from dis-
aster assistance made available to similarly situated secular institutions would violate the Free
Exercise Clause." Id.
" Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 609 (1971).
'7 Authority of FEMA to Provide Disaster Assistance, supra note 170. The memo cites three
cases in response to the argument: Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), in which the Court
held that federal construction grants for university facilities must be restricted indefinitely for
secular purposes; Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), in which the
Court invalidated a provision in state maintenance and repair grants excluding religious schools
on the basis that such aid could not be restricted to secular purposes; and Hunt v. McNair, 413
U.S. 734, 744 (1973), in which the Court sustained state financing of construction for a reli-
gious college under a program that barred financing of "buildings or facilities used for religious
purposes.
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Fortunately for FEMA and the damaged religious schools, how-
ever, this potential vulnerability may not invalidate the school re-
building program altogether. A changed Supreme Court would
eventually determine the program's constitutionality under the Estab-
lishment Clause, and with the additions of Chief Justice John Roberts
and Associate Justice Samuel Alito, the Court is far more conservative
and religion-friendly than when it decided Mitchell or Zelman.7 6 This
shift in ideology is important because it aligns the Court far more
squarely with the views of the plurality from Mitchell.1 7 As a result, the
Court's new majority might only consider a valid secular purpose and
neutrality as the necessary prerequisites to withstand challenge under
the Establishment Clause.1 8 True private choice became a relevant
criterion only through Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Mitchell,
and with her recent retirement, its place as a dispositive factor in the
Court's Establishment Clause standard is far less certain. If the Court
did revert to the reasoning of Mitchell's plurality, this decision would
not only clarify the remaining ambiguity in the Court's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, it would also signify a considerable expansion
of potentially permissible relief programs. Top among these new
permissible programs, FEMA's education rebuilding policy would
likely pass muster as well.
V. CONCLUSION: REBUILDING WITHOUT RESOLUTION
In sum, when examining the various efforts taken by FEMA to re-
habilitate the Gulf Coast, it appears that many-if not all-of the gov-
ernment's actions have not and will not violate the Establishment
Clause. Paramount to this conclusion is the fact that each of the gov-
ernment's programs has the same legitimate secular purpose: to aid
in rebuilding this devastated area of the United States. Equally as
important, each program also appears to be entirely neutral in its ap-
plicability to potential providers and beneficiaries. No federal action
or program singled out religion for better or for worse, and eligibility
'76 For an example of Chief Justice Roberts's support of religious groups, see generally Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577
(May 24, 1991) (No. 90-1014), 1990 U.S. Briefs 1014, 1991 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 308. Simi-
larly, for Justice Alito, see generally Child Evangelism Fellowship of New Jersey Inc. v. Stafford Town-
ship School District, 386 F.3d 514 (3d Cir. 2004), in which he concludes that a religious group's
equal access to fora provided by a school district to the broad spectrum of other community
groups would not result in an impermissible endorsement of religion, and ACLU of New Jersey v.
Township of Wall, 246 F.3d 258 (3d Cir. 2001), in which he struck down the legal challenge of a
religious holiday display.
77 See supra notes 96-110 and accompanying text.
This new majority would presumably consist of the remaining justices from Mitchell's plu-
rality, Justices Thomas, Scalia, and Kennedy, and the new additions to the Court, Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito.
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depends on nonreligious factors such as an aid provider's level of ex-
pertise or a victim-beneficiary's need of assistance.
The only remaining Establishment Clause issue requiring deter-
mination, then, is whether true private choice survives as a necessary
factor according to the newly minted Supreme Court. If so, this may
have a large and adverse effect on many of FEMA's proposed pro-
grams. However, regardless of this possible complexity, other legal,
political and humanitarian considerations remain in FEMA's favor.
In the American legal system, until a plaintiff actually brings a legal
challenge in court, the government is free to continue pursuing even
blatantly unconstitutional policies. Consequently, to prevent the
government from employing any programs that would violate the Es-
tablishment Clause, an opponent would have to bring a lawsuit to en-
join FEMA from providing further disaster aid.
In the current political environment, this type of legal challenge is
very unlikely. To do so would force the plaintiff to declare his or her
constitutional rights as more valuable than ensuring the livelihood of
thousands of American citizens. Moreover, a lawsuit would slow
down the already hindered rebuilding process and thereby cause
even more harm to the devastated region. To this date, no critic or
civil liberties group has been willing to take such action, and with in-
creasing public support for government funding of religious organi-
zations,17T such legal challenge may never occur. In the end, though,
whatever the reason for the lack of legal challenge, the absence can
only help the Gulf Coast region in its long struggle to become the
beautiful and welcoming place it once was.
THE PEW RESEARCH CENTER, PUBLIC DIVIDED ON ORIGINS OF LIFE: RELIGION A STRENGTH
AND WEAKNESS FOR BOTH PARTIES (Aug. 30, 2005), available at http://peoplepress.org/reports/
display.php3?PageID=988 (showing that sixty-six percent still support faith-based initiative pro-
grams in 2005).
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